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1. PRELIMINARY 
As liberal democratic states, EU countries have all recognized freedom of religion as one 
of the pillars of civil liberties, which also include freedom of expression and association 
and, as such, are embodied in constitutions as fundamental rights. How such rights are 
then implemented in the various countries — by which norms and regulations — varies, 
but constitutional protection cuts across national differences in this respect and corre-
sponds to the UN and EU charters on human rights. Yet, despite this constitutional pro-
tection umbrella, resistance to the building of proper mosques has proved fierce and 
widespread throughout Europe. The generality of the opposition to purpose-built 
mosques suggests that here we are not simply confronted with cases of occasional right 
violation, similar to stealing with reference to property rights. This resistance is all the 
more mystifying if we consider that any significant issue of toleration should apparently 
be preempted by the constitutional rights of freedom of religion, expression and associa-
tion. And in fact, some commentators on the mosque issue state that it is not an issue of 
toleration, given that no one wants to convert Muslims to Christianity or to repress their 
religion (Allievi 2010, 28). In their view, the mosque issue is part of the larger process of 
cultural and religion integration of immigrant minorities, with all the related problems  
of accommodation and negotiation with the cultural majority. Others scholars, though, 
think that freedom of religion should include places of worship and, in this respect, the 
mosque issue is an impairment of such a right. But it is not clear whether the limitation  
of such a right may be properly labelled as a problem of toleration, given that the reasons 
for objecting to mosques do not question the right of Muslims to their faith (Moulin-
Doos 2011). 
 
 1 This article stems from a project funded under the European Commission’s 7th Framework Programme, 
Project RESPECT: Towards a Topography of  Tolerance and Equal Respect (contract n. 244549). The 
information and views in this article are those of  the author and do not necessarily reflect the official 
opinion of  the European Commission. An earlier version of  this article was presented at the workshop 
“Respect and Tolerance in Europe: A Comparative Perspective”, University of  Nicosia, July 1-2, 2011. I am 
grateful to Michalis Kontos, Emanuela Ceva, Sune Lægaard, Enrico Biale, Valeria Ottonelli and Federico 
Zuolo for their comments. 
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In this paper I suggest that the conflict over mosque building is a question of toleration 
typical of contemporary democracy. But to do this I have to update the conception of tol-
eration to capture the nature of questions of toleration in contemporary democracy. I 
hold that when toleration becomes a political principle inbuilt in liberal constitutions, not 
all questions of toleration are preempted and automatically solved by reference to liberty 
rights. Cultural differences, such as dress codes, dietary requirements, religious practices 
and everything that constitutes the very stuff of contemporary pluralism, repeatedly fuel 
questions of toleration that are prominent in the agenda of democratic politics, at the  
local, national and supranational levels. However, for the reasons I set out in the first  
section of the paper, these issues cannot be properly grasped within the framework  
of the traditional doctrine of toleration. This explains why there is such uncertainty about 
defining the mosque conflict as a problem of toleration. Obviously, if the nature of the 
problem is not properly understood, possible solutions may easily miss the point insofar 
as they are responses to a different problem. Thus the first section of this paper seeks to 
demonstrate that the mosque conflict is now a veritable issue of toleration. This definition 
implies not only a theoretical reassessment of toleration theory, but also bears political 
implications that it is important to consider. 
 I then examine some of the theoretical aspects of revisiting toleration along the lines I 
have just mentioned. They mainly concern: (a) reassessment of the private/public divide 
as a useful boundary for toleration; (b) the intersection of the horizontal and the vertical 
notions of toleration, namely the social attitude and the political dimension; (c) the  
politicization of cultural issues by the democratic process, which tends to transform  
the cultural dialectic between majority and minority into a political one. 
 After mapping the nature of toleration problems today, I argue that, in the case of 
mosques, the problematic difference engendering the conflict is not the Muslim religion 
per se, nor its practices of worship which are allegedly incompatible, offensive and unac-
ceptable by democratic society. It is rather that the Muslim religion provides a unifying  
label to group together many immigrant communities whose growing number and  
presence are perceived as threatening the orderly stability of the social standards of the 
cultural majority. Social standards grant a recognizable public landscape and smooth social 
coordination over time; toleration issues erupt when the different customs and conven-
tions brought by newcomers symbolically displace the public landscape. Here is where the 
issue of public space, both urban and symbolic, merges with toleration and resistance to 
newcomers takes off. Showing that resistance to mosques, as well as to other Muslim 
practices and customs, is not produced by a clash of civilization will help to fight the  
thesis of “Islamic exceptionalism”, meaning the specific difficulty tied to the reception of 
Islam and its manifestations in European countries (Allievi 2010, 11-13). This definition is  
supposedly used by social scientists in a descriptive sense to signal the difficult reception 
of Muslims, but insofar as it suggests that there is some intrinsic problem with Islam that 
makes it less easy to integrate in other contexts, it projects quite misleading effects. My  
argument intends to explain away “exceptionalism”, showing that resistance is a typical 
standoff between cultural majorities and minorities over the control of social standards, 
and that Islam is not only a covering label for many different immigrant groups, but  
also an opportunity to articulate cultural dislike in public reason concerning its essential 
incompatibility with democracy. 
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My argument is construed by drawing considerations from some case studies in this field 
of research, specifically, from Denmark (Lægaard 2011), Germany (Moulin-Doos 2011) 
and Italy (Mocchi 2011), which, despite differences in the management and outcomes of 
conflict over mosque building, to my mind represent comparable examples. All three 
countries are established democracies and old members of the European Union, where 
the presence of a Muslim minority is the result of waves of immigration and not a specific 
national minority. In Germany this immigration started much earlier, in the 1960s, and 
was mainly of Turkish origin, whereas in Denmark and Italy it started in the 1980s and 
has been more varied as to its national origin. Despite this significant difference, Muslims 
are now an established presence in all three countries, but since Islam has no proper reli-
gious organization, their common religious identity has yet to find a unified representative 
voice. In the three contexts, Muslims enjoy different levels of political representation: in 
Germany many are citizens and have full political rights; in Denmark they can vote in  
local elections; in Italy they are deprived of any political representation. Yet the lack of a 
proper unified congregation that can speak for the whole community in cases such as that 
of places of worship makes their claim more difficult for democratic institutions to meet, 
since the rights enjoyed by different religions often depend on their being enlisted as one 
of the religions acknowledged by the state or, as in the case of Italy, on having subscribed 
a concordat with the state. In this type of situation, the problem of funding often  
becomes crucial because Muslim communities cannot access the public funding reserved 
to enlisted and recognized religions, while communities are also divided by national origin, 
hence associations frequently receive funding from Muslim states, such as Morocco,  
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Such foreign funding is publicly perceived as dangerous, 
suspect and highly problematic, especially if the funds come from fundamentalist coun-
tries such as Iran, but also Saudi Arabia. Foreign funding fuels the idea of the risk of the 
Islamization of Europe and has played a significant role in resistance to mosque building. 
 These are basically the common traits that have framed public discourse for and 
against the building of mosques in these very similar contexts. The issue of public order, 
understood either as the risk of terrorism or as a threat to orderly and stable social life or 
both, the issue of the architectural disruption of urban public space and aesthetics, and 
the issue of segregation/integration are present in all three. What changes more than any-
thing else is the institutional response. The more the presence of Muslims in society is 
consolidated, the more open the response. Here Germany takes the lead and Italy lags  
behind in third place. This observation suggests that toleration is a function of the politi-
cal weight of a community on the one hand, and of time on the other. In this respect, the 
examples of Cyprus (Emilianides-Adamides 2011) and Israel (Roman 2011) are very inter-
esting since they provide important reference points of how differently societies where 
Muslims are established local communities view the problem. In both contexts, though 
Muslims are the “others” with respect to the national identity, their established presence 
makes their mosques, practices and rituals familiar and uncontested as opposed to an ob-
ject for toleration. The situation changes, however, when at stake there are new buildings 
in new zones (Israel) or when immigrant Muslims expect to share the places of worship 
and facilities of the local communities (Cyprus). The case of Slovenia (Pribac 2011), which 
I address at the end of the paper, represents yet another example of intolerance, one 
prompted by the wilful misrecognition of a national minority in a time of nation-building. 
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2. TOLERATION IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
 
The typical issues of toleration in liberal democracy are somewhat different from those in 
pre-liberal states. In the latter two actors were relevant: the sovereign and the dissenting 
party, whose faith was believed to be wrong and devious. The former had the power to 
repress or to tolerate the dissenting party, that is to act on the basis of their disapproval or 
of other considerations, usually that of peace. If these latter considerations were more 
compelling than the former, then toleration — i.e. non-interference — would follow. The 
traditional doctrine of toleration is patterned on such a model. Namely, there are two  
parties in asymmetrical positions and the more powerful party’s dislike of the difference 
provides reasons to suppress it, but subsequently there are reasons to suspend the dislike 
and to stop the interference. Toleration is precisely this kind of non-interference. In  
contemporary democracy, this model is obviously too simplistic; it may apply to the  
social, horizontal attitude of toleration between two social parties, but it does not capture 
the role of political authority. Liberty rights that enjoy constitutional protection should 
preempt a democratic state’s being tolerant or intolerant; toleration has become a princi-
ple inbuilt in liberal constitutions and embodied in universal rights. In this respect, liberal 
democratic states have to enforce toleration in the form of equal rights among their citi-
zens: for democratic authorities toleration is no longer an option but a political obligation; 
in turn, no matter how intolerant the feelings they harbour, citizens ought to be tolerant 
to others, hence respect others’ rights. From this viewpoint, it would seem that all non-
trivial issues of toleration are preempted by the constitutional structure of democracy,  
and that only socially and politically irrelevant interpersonal problems of toleration —  
between neighbours, colleagues and so on — may arise. 
 Yet genuine questions of toleration have not disappeared, not only because of legal  
infringements and the difficulty of living up to the ideal of a tolerant society, but also  
because toleration is valued both as a political principle and as a social virtue only within 
certain limits, beyond which it is transformed into culpable indulgence towards wrongs. 
The two classical limits to toleration were elaborated in the self-defence of the political 
order (Locke [1685] 1991) and in the third party harm principle (Mill [1859] 1972). Both 
principles appear beyond dispute, yet prove to be highly controversial in their interpreta-
tion and application, a point I return to below. Contemporary issues of toleration do not 
question either the principle or the virtue of toleration, but revolve around where to trace 
its limits. Here lies the trickiness of contemporary questions whose nature, at first sight, 
may appear different from traditional problems of toleration. For, in point of fact, no one 
argues today against liberty rights, no one wants to force conversion on dissenters or  
suppress them as a way of eradicating heresy more effectively. The discussion, rather, 
concerns whether a certain practice, behaviour and the like trespasses on the intolerable 
or crosses the boundary of toleration, entering a space where interference is perfectly  
justified. 
 While the traditional argument was put forward by champions of toleration, and,  
taking for granted the reasons for the suppression of the disapproved difference aimed  
at providing reasons for stopping suppression in favour of toleration, in contemporary 
questions of toleration the argument is advanced by those who advocate the stopping of 
toleration, and takes tolerance for granted, while spelling out reasons to explain why the 
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difference in question is beyond tolerance, that is beyond the limits of tolerance (Raphael 1988). 
Hence the dispute is about where to trace those limits and, more precisely, whether x falls 
inside or outside the wall protecting the tolerant society from disruption and citizens from 
harm. As a consequence, whether x is defined as an issue of toleration depends on where 
one thinks that x falls, inside or outside. For if x is believed to fall inside the boundary of 
toleration, then the opposite position is doomed to be an instance of intolerance, and x  
a proper issue for toleration. By contrast, if x is held to fall outside, then the issue is seen 
as not touching toleration, well protected in its limited domain, but rather as involving 
other principles and reasons, justly leading to interference with x, but not for reasons of 
intolerance. Here interference is held to be justified, not because the reasons for objecting 
to x are stronger than the reasons for accepting it, but because x trespasses on the limits 
of toleration, endangering social order and peace or harming others by upsetting their  
expectations. The point of the reasons for and against x is, therefore, not whether the  
reasons for toleration enable one to overcome the original reasons for disapproval, as in 
the traditional framework; here, according to some interpretations, the point is whether x 
displays properties that meet the requirements of the intolerable as specified by the self-
defence and harm principles. Hence, though it remains a motivational factor, the original 
judgment of dislike is indeed (or should be) irrelevant for the justification of interference 
with x. 
 In this way, we can explain why, for some actors and commentators, the conflict over 
mosque building does not question toleration and freedom of religion, but instead con-
cerns public order, or architectural suitability, or the risk of nurturing terrorism and so on. 
According to this view, the mosque case presents some features that cross the boundary 
of toleration and allow interference to be justified by self-defence against the social risk 
and cultural harm allegedly implied in the building of a mosque. 
 Before examining the arguments for “border policing”, as it were, I wish to stress the 
implications that the definition of the issue has in the political contest. Defining the  
resistance to mosque building as either intolerant or, contrariwise, justified by the limits of 
toleration has an impact on political discourse that goes well beyond analytical precision. 
Toleration is a cherished value in democratic societies, and liberty rights are fundamental 
in democratic politics. Both are well entrenched in public reason and there is no voice 
openly attacking them, which is why no one likes to be labelled as intolerant or illiberal. 
Hence defining resistance to mosque building as a problem over and above toleration is 
politically crucial in bringing one’s view in line with public reason. If, however, it can be 
shown that resistance to mosque building is an instance of intolerance because the  
invoked limits to toleration are untenable, then the objection to mosque building loses  
legitimacy and the incompatibility is shown to be not between democracy and mosques, 
but instead between intolerant resistance to mosques and democratic principles. As we 
can see, matters of definition have a great deal of substance, at least in a case like this one. 
 
 
 
3. IS MOSQUE BUILDING BEYOND THE TOLERABLE? 
I now focus on the alleged limits to toleration. If we look at the list of reasons that  
supposedly justify the limits of toleration in the Danish, German and Italian cases, we see 
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that most of the arguments refer to an underlying idea according to which, while tolera-
tion is definitely granted in the private domain, public space is instead legitimately subject 
to legal and political restrictions. The spatial demarcation of toleration within the private 
sphere then intertwines and overlaps with the two principled limits, harm to others and 
self-defence. This overlap is the case of arguments referring to laicité, public security,  
aesthetics, religious, and (specifically Islamic) invasion, and public transparency connected 
to funding and preaching. All these arguments point to the risk of proper mosques for  
social and political order by relying on the private/public divide according to which toler-
ation is granted in the private sphere, while the public domain instead requires restrictions 
of personal liberty for the sake of public order, lato sensu, and of the non-harming of  
others, also lato sensu. 
 Here we are faced with one of the ambiguities of the traditional theory of toleration 
(Galeotti 2002, 25). The original doctrine, as spelled out by Locke for instance, relied on 
and worked through the private/public distinction. The public area was concerned with 
matters of peace and order and constituted the political sphere, that is the domain subject 
to political authorities and public regulation. The private area, by contrast, was concerned 
with issues irrelevant to order and peace, hence an area in which the state had no reason 
to intervene with coercive action. This protected area, where political intervention was to 
be suspended, constituted the proper domain of toleration. This political argument, which 
showed that toleration was affordable, even more convenient than repression, was effec-
tive insofar as absolute sovereigns were persuaded by it, yet it induced an ambiguity in the 
scope and proper domain of toleration that has become explosive in liberal democracy. 
Private matters, protected by personal liberties, are neither always subtracted from public 
sight nor eo ipso immune from political intervention. A paradigmatic example is family life, 
which is the most typical locus of intimate relationships and private matters, but at once is 
regulated by legal norms for the implementation of the rights of its components — and in 
cases of right and norm violation, institutional interference is justified and necessary. 
 Religious beliefs and moral convictions are subjects of conscience, the inner forum  
being their ultimate judge. Yet, given that personal liberty includes freedom of expression 
and freedom of association, this does not imply that they are confined within the private 
area of conscience. In a sense, had religion been confined within the inner citadel, no 
question about toleration would ever have arisen. Freedom of religion does not mean 
freedom to pray to one’s God in the seclusion of one’s bedroom, but the freedom to ex-
press one’s faith through the proper forms and rituals — and dedicated places of worship 
are crucial to this dimension of religion. In European cultures, for example, churches have 
always been built on squares, at the centre of community life. But not all that is public, 
that is “in public sight”, is also political and, by the same token, not all that is non-political 
is private, that is “outside public sight”. There is a wide area of public life, the area of civil 
society, which is neither political nor strictly private. Where are the boundaries of tolera-
tion to be traced then? Are they to delimit or include civil society? It is not sufficient  
to move the boundary between civil society and the political domain stricto sensu because, 
in this respect, the spatial metaphor is rather confusing. Personal liberty is made up of a 
number of rights protecting the person from unjustified interferences and impositions, 
not only at home but everywhere. Personal liberty is restricted by the rights of other  
people, and it is almost trivial to add that these restrictions are usually more significant in 
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social contexts than at home, yet if personal liberty does not infringe on others’ rights it is 
not restricted anywhere. Think of the following example: personal liberty allows Anna to 
have as many tattoos and piercings as she likes. This “body language” is by no means  
universally approved in society, yet it is considered legitimate and tolerated accordingly. 
As a matter of fact, Anna is disapproved on account of her tattoos even in her own  
family, but being of age, she is free to do as she pleases. When she walks on her campus,  
a state campus, every day, she does not have to cover her tattoos and piercings and, 
whether she is liked or not, no teacher, administrator or janitor will prevent her from  
entering the premises with her tattooed arms and pierced nose well in sight. She brings 
her liberty with herself to the public square and institutional spaces, because her bodily 
expression of that liberty is not harmful to anybody else, even if it is genuinely disliked  
by a few people. It would be different if Anna were also a true believer in some new age 
sect and, on this basis, expected to impose a prayer to the sun in class. In that case, her 
personal freedom would be restricted in state university or school because it would be a 
trespass on the liberty of others, whereas at Venice Beach or at her club it would not. 
 Keeping this example in mind, it is clear that personal freedom is not confined to one’s 
home or to strictly private spaces, just as it is also clear that freedom of expression — for 
instance, of religious convictions — is subject to some restrictions in political-institutional 
places to prevent it trespassing on the liberty of others. Before concluding on the private/ 
public divide, two final observations are in order. First: the example of Anna’s tattoos 
shows that a cultural majority’s eccentricities are not only definitely legal, but also well  
tolerated in all three aforementioned kinds of social space: private, public and political. 
This implies that, for members of the majority, the ambiguities of the political theory of 
toleration do not count. The same does not hold for members of a minority; for Fatima, 
for example, who covers her head with a niqab. In this case, the overlap between the  
private/public divide and the principled limits to toleration works as follows: the strange-
ness of the niqab, with all its connected symbolism (Scott 2007), causes uneasiness and 
worry in residents in the majority, hence upsets their expectations and orderly daily life. In 
this way, the niqab is taken to undermine public order, hence to deserve toleration only  
in private, which, depending on the context, may exclude only the political sphere or  
also civil society. Briefly, according to this argument, because they are disliked and cause 
uneasiness — like Anna with her piercing — veiled women must be secluded from public 
sight — unlike Anna — apparently for reasons of order. To approach the mosque issue 
from a normative point of view, we must keep the examples of Anna and Fatima clearly 
in mind and see through the double standards governing toleration in either case. 
 Second: in the area of civil society, insofar as it does not involve behaviour regarding 
others, such as driving or the stipulation of contracts, personal liberty has no or only  
minor legal restrictions. Order here depends on social conventions, usually spontaneously 
evolved, which are not legally sanctioned but are, nonetheless, quite effective in producing 
social coordination (Nagel 1998; Lewis 1969). Dress codes, body language, rules of greet-
ing and politeness, food habits, and customs of various kinds are so ingrained in everyday 
life and routine that they have escaped people’s awareness (Hayek 1982). They constitute 
the societal standards of propriety and urbanity and orderly decorum of the society in  
question. Albeit emerging spontaneously, these social conventions have sometimes found 
space in public regulations and legislation, as is the case of the weekly day of rest, holiday 
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distribution, the timetables of shops and restaurants and the like. Without being aware of 
their existence and working, people regulate their lives and pattern their lifestyles on them, 
and thereby achieve the feeling of order and stability necessary to make plans and take 
risks. When groups of newcomers arrive, bringing with them different social customs and 
conventions, societal standards are threatened, and sectors of the cultural majority feel  
upset, uprooted and insecure, displaced by different dress codes, different foods and 
smells, and different voices and accents. This is precisely the area in which questions of 
toleration erupt in multicultural democracy. What is really at stake is the control of socie-
tal standards, which represents the specific power of cultural majorities over cultural  
minorities. It is this social asymmetry that gives rise to problems of toleration. Toleration 
contests in contemporary democracy are thus unambiguously over public space, that  
is over the public display of social differences which changes the urban landscape both 
visually and symbolically (Galeotti 2002, 89-93). 
 I can now trace three normative implications of the argument on the public/private 
divide: 
 the fact that the feeling of displacement and insecurity is genuine in cultural majorities 
does not justify consequent intolerant attitudes; 
 the fact that the contest concerns the conventional regulation of public space explains 
why those objecting to revisions of societal standards in order to accommodate minor-
ity habits and practices justify their objection by referring to a narrow interpretation  
of tolerance limited to private space. By disregarding the above ambiguities of the pri-
vate/public divide and ignoring how the latter works according to the traits, patterns 
and practices of the majority, the objectors state that the public display of religious 
symbols, different dress codes and so on is a trespass on the public sphere, where gen-
eral rules bind everyone and personal liberty is legitimately restricted in the name of 
liberal neutrality; 
 the issue of compatibility, usually invoked by the objectors, whereby different practices 
and religious rituals are “intrinsically” incompatible with the ethical and political prin-
ciples underpinning democratic society, hence cannot be tolerated poena the disruption 
of liberal democracy, has to be reinterpreted as a contest over societal standards. Once 
relocated, this incompatibility will appear to concern not political principles, but rather 
the established identity of public spaces with newcomers’ practices, habits and ways of 
gathering. 
The private/public divide argument now provides an interpretive standpoint from which 
to view the reasons invoked for limiting toleration in the case of mosque building.  
We must remember that, since the status quo is one of toleration, the issue is raised by  
objectors to mosque building, social actors or political spokespersons who claim that  
limits have been trespassed. Likewise, responses are not meant to be persuasive about the 
merits of toleration but, instead, about the unsoundness of its alleged limits. 
 I do not consider the laicité argument, since it coincides with the strict demarcation of 
tolerance to the private sphere outlined above. Needless to say, the laicité argument is 
faulty in terms of both double standards and consideration of the public sphere as a puri-
fied space of equality where different social identities are all banned (Galeotti 1993). The 
various other reasons voiced in the debate — the risk of fundamentalism and terrorism, 
the Islamization of society, problematic funding from suspect states interfering in our  
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society, the upsetting of the urban landscape — can all be grouped under the heading  
of an objection about public order, for all point to the fact that accepting proper mosques 
in our cities — maybe side by side with cathedrals, maybe with minarets higher than  
belfries — will induce political and social disorder and instability at various levels. I thus 
focus on public order, unpacking all the components of the argument, and conclude that 
none represents a sufficient reason to stop toleration of mosques, though there are some 
grounds for local populations to be worried that need to be addressed politically. The ar-
gument about public order shows what the contest over toleration is really about, namely 
the control of societal standards. 
 Public order sometimes means “law and order”, other times it means stability in civil 
society. When the former is the case, it may refer to two different worries: on the one 
hand, a literal concern for “public order” with regard to petty crime, traffic, parking prob-
lems and so on; on the other, a concern that expands symbolically to include state security 
and the survival of democracy. The literal sense of “public order” points to the legitimate, 
if narrow, worries of residents afraid that their daily lives, traffic and parking will get 
worse in the area surrounding the new mosque. Such worries, however, are not specific to 
mosques and Muslim rituals, but are also similar to those raised by new shopping malls, 
cinemas or clubs, and, as such, need to be attended to by administrators without neces-
sarily engendering a case of toleration. It makes no sense to discuss toleration with regard 
to shopping malls or clubs, though not everybody likes them. In this case, the wise admin-
istrator knows that it is necessary to set apart albeit important practical worries, which 
need to be solved by good planning, from other less material, less explicit, but often more 
acute concerns. 
 This is the case of the “public order” objection whereby a purpose-built mosque would 
be a general threat to security and democracy. In ordinary language, a threat to public  
order is caused by social or political unrest, violent demonstrations, attacks to persons  
and properties and the like. Public order typically pertains to the political sphere, and  
police action — and, in the most acute cases, even military intervention — is required to 
preserve the primary good of politics, namely law and order. When public order is at risk, 
citizens’ security is threatened and it is the state’s duty to protect citizens’ lives, freedom 
and property preventing or intervening against disruptive, violent actions, with the use of 
force if necessary. Law and order is the first raison-d’être of politics and toleration does not 
count in this respect. Hence, public order is the first and undisputed reason for stopping 
toleration in the face of agitators and violent parties, but it is doubtful whether the build-
ing of a proper mosque can actually create a problem for law and order in this sense. 
 Such a risk is allegedly represented by Islamic fundamentalism, which has indeed been 
a real threat to citizens’ security in the last few decades. No one undervalues terrorism 
stemming from fundamentalism, but the connection between terrorism, fundamentalism 
and Islam suggested by objectors to mosques such as Ralph Giordano in the Cologne case 
(Moulin-Doos 2011) or the politicians of the Lega Nord in Milan (Mocchi 2011) is, never-
theless, far from being established. According to this extreme view, moderate Islam is 
merely a cover to gain easy tolerance from our overindulgent democracies. This view, 
which is fuelling Islamophobia throughout Europe, clearly defies all the evidence. A mere 
pretence, it can only be maintained belief in an underlying conspiracy theory discounting 
the wide majority of moderate and secular Muslims (Allievi-Nielsen 2003). But even if  
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we accept this implausible view for a moment, the objection to mosque building does not 
follow. The fact is that anti-Islam intellectuals and politicians do not dare to the demand 
the direct expulsion of the Muslim population from European countries or the forced 
conversion of Muslims to Christianity. Such measures, though hardly legitimate, would 
actually be the consistent consequence of holding that Islam is intrinsically intolerable, 
and yet they are clearly out of question in the world of liberal democracy. So if Muslims 
are to live with us in any case, why should proper mosques constitute a special danger? 
Why should purpose-built mosques, as opposed to backyard mosques, represent a special 
risk of terrorism? For if it is the gathering of people which is regarded as dangerous in 
terms of proselytism and propaganda, then backyard mosques are all the more dangerous 
insofar as they are less visible and more suitable for achieving secret goals. Even in the 
light of the extreme anti-Islamic stand, the opposition to mosque building is inconsistent 
and ineffectual as a justified limit to toleration for the sake of order and the self-
preservation of democracy. The lack of a purpose-built mosque does not contribute one 
inch to the enhancement of citizens’ security against terrorism. 
 Implicit in the mosque, however, is a lesser threat to law and order, namely that repre-
sented by the apparent desire for non-integration signalled by Muslim self-seclusion in a 
proper mosque, a symbol of an alien culture and suspect faith thrown into the middle of  
a western, democratic city (Lægaard 2011; Moulin-Doos 2011). Some commentators see 
sort of perverse will to offer a clear sign of rejection of our culture and of integration. 
This argument may touch the emotional chords of majority’s feeling but it hardly makes 
sense. The underlying idea seems to be that, if a religious group wants to gather and pray 
in such an exotic and alien building, totally unfit for our urban landscape, it is perversely 
attached to a culture which is, by analogy, similarly unfit to be accommodated in ours. 
This reasoning seems to forget that a place of worship is, by definition, reserved to the 
community that shares that creed, that religious rituals and prayers are necessarily specific 
to that faith, and that it is a good thing for no imposition to be made on others. When  
engaged in practices of worship, all believers in all religions gather together and tempo-
rarily “segregate” themselves from other activities and other aspects of public life. Are we 
to infer that all believers are not properly integrated? Either we hold that religion as such 
is a factor of non-integration or we acknowledge that Muslims have the same right to  
a proper place of worship as any other congregation. As to a mosque’s exotic and alien 
appearance compared to that of a church, it is not unlike any architectural innovation in 
our cities. I conclude, therefore, that the idea that self-segregation might lead to a risk for 
law and order is misplaced. The architectural argument is the only one with a basis but, 
taken at face value, it can be addressed. And, as has emerged from the cases under con-
sideration, Muslims have been very open to negotiation and design revision. 
 As I have said, public order may also mean the orderly stability of social life by means 
of traditional standards and conventions. This second sense of public order is less clearly 
spelled out, yet it makes more sense as a reason for worry, though not as a reason justify-
ing intolerance. The opaque element lies in this: while law and order constitutes the  
proper sphere of political intervention and regulations, it is far from clear that societal 
standards and conventions are a legitimate subject of legal intervention and protection  
because they have spontaneously evolved and must be open for further evolution. Some 
of those conventions have found a legal counterpart, like family law; others, such as  
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shop timetables, are subject to administrative regulations. Yet most of them are simply 
standards of propriety and urbanity, and do not look like areas where state interference  
is legitimate in a liberal order. Thus it is not straightforward to invoke a stoppage to toler-
ation in this area. In other words, in this respect we are confronted with a real problem, 
not simply an imaginary one induced by prejudice, yet one which is not an obvious issue 
for political interference, for usually the area of societal standards is free from legitimate 
state intervention and open to social evolution. But social conventions are the crucial 
components of the stability of public life, of its public identity, over time, hence  
their defence is claimed to justify coercive action. Societal standards are fundamental in 
allowing stable expectations and social coordination, not just for emotional or affective 
reasons. It is no wonder then that newcomers with strange customs and practices are  
perceived as a threat to this identity and as unduly unsettling the orderly stability of public 
life. We can thus say that, understood in this way, the public order objection has a real  
basis and content, insofar as the newcomers with their different traditions will somehow 
change the present social order, the identity of public life and public landscape. This 
change is now affecting people’s lives as much as phenomena such as urbanization and 
internal migration did in the past. The majority’s uneasiness should be acknowledged and 
taken seriously, but it cannot eo ipso constitute a sufficient reason for stopping toleration 
of the public presence of immigrants’ differences, such as that of purpose-built mosques. 
 In the broad discussion over the harm principle, one thing has been clear since Mill’s 
original formulation (Horton 1985; Jones 1985; Raz 1988; Schauer 1993; Galeotti 2007). If 
uneasiness, dislike and disapproval towards the potential subject of toleration could count 
as harm, hence as a limit on toleration, then toleration as such would be dismissed from 
the outset, given that the feeling of uneasiness and dislike for a difference is the first cir-
cumstance for any question of toleration to arise (Hart 1962). That feeling is precisely 
what the tolerant attitude ought to overcome by reference to higher-order considerations 
such as respect for people. In other words, that which is the first circumstance for tolera-
tion cannot apply twice, first as a reason for toleration, and secondly as a reason for limit-
ing toleration. In that case, dislike would not be a proper limit but rather an outright  
dismissal of toleration as such. Yet in the discussion of the Milan and Cologne cases the 
majority’s feelings of uneasiness and dislike for strange symbols and buildings have been 
taken as “harm”, hence as a reason for non-toleration of purpose-built mosques. 
 In defence of this intolerant view, the objector to mosques may rejoin as follows: 
“Why should we, the society majority and citizens of the polity, tolerate their customs out 
of respect for them, instead of them tolerating our customs out of respect for us? As  
our guests, they ought to adapt to our ways of life, which do not include mosques and 
minarets in public squares. We are indeed tolerant because we do not force them to  
become Christian and let them pray as they like in their own homes or secluded spaces, 
but we cannot tolerate their invasion of our public spaces and cities, which would not be 
respectful of our local tradition.” Depending on whether it concerns minority or majority 
practices, this answer subscribes a dual conception of toleration. Minorities are granted 
only minimal toleration, closely restricted to private spaces out of sight, while the majority 
reserves itself a maximal understanding of toleration. At present, minority groups are 
simply not asked to tolerate our tradition, which de facto they have no power to interfere 
with, hence are not even in a condition to tolerate anyway (Galeotti 2001). They are  
  24 
 
 
Anna Elisabetta Galeotti 
A European issue of toleration:  
Why purpose-built mosques are so contested 
defined “tolerant” of our tradition on the condition that they withhold their claims con-
cerning mosques and other alien differences, since those claims are seen as upsetting our 
tradition. Hence the majority’s expectations, which immigrants or people of immigrant  
origins allegedly have a duty to respect. 
 Here I confine my comments to the toleration reserved to minorities, toleration for 
majorities being conceptually untenable since minorities lack the power of interference, 
hence are deprived of one of the very conditions for toleration. The minimal conception 
clearly dispenses with respect for people, since equal respect means accepting others  
as they are, not despite what they are (Galeotti 2010). Private toleration and the public  
invisibility of one’s identity imply that acceptance is achieved only by disguising one’s 
identity, hence that Muslims as such are not considered as our equals and are not fully  
respected in their dignity. Public visibility is, therefore, a condition for toleration to be 
based on equal respect and for minorities to be properly included in our society, as  
implied by democratic principles. Toleration of Muslim religion in public, with all its  
implications — such as proper places of worship, cultural centres and so on — is not an 
extension of liberal toleration from private to public; it is simply the extension of the very 
same toleration enjoyed by all established congregations to Muslim communities. Not  
to make this extension would imply the injustice of double standards. In conclusion, the 
objection to the building of proper mosques is unjust as it would unfairly limit Muslims’ 
rights of religious freedom, expression and association, rights that are granted to members 
of other religions. This conclusion shows that there are no justifiable grounds for denying 
permission for mosque building. It also shows that objections to mosques are bluntly  
intolerant. It is important to establish this normative bottom line, which is not often  
clearly spelled out in public discussion. But it is also important to acknowledge that  
this normative stand, crucial as it is, is far from sufficient in settling the issue politically  
and pragmatically. This is because the problem of worries about the stability of social 
standards has to be taken up politically. 
 
 
 
4. THE INTERSECTION OF THE HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL DIMENSIONS  
OF TOLERATION 
The argument has now reached the point where the issue of the intersection of the hori-
zontal and the vertical problem of toleration has to be addressed. Understanding how the 
two axes intersect in the mosque question, as in most questions of contemporary tolera-
tion, is important not only for the theory of toleration, but also for the political solution 
of the issue. 
 So far, we have seen that the framework of the problem is as follows: 
• liberal democracy implies that toleration is a political principle inbuilt in the consti-
tution and granted by equal rights of liberty; 
• toleration is no more an option for democratic states, but an obligation towards  
all citizens and a correlative obligation of right enforcement against horizontal  
violation; 
• questions around toleration do still arise concerning the limits of toleration, beyond 
which state intervention is justified; 
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• the controversy over the limits of toleration concern the public space, by which we 
mean both the proper political sphere and social life which is in public sight; 
• the objectors to mosque building maintain that their position is not intolerant,  
because (a) they do not want to convert Muslims who are free to practice their faith, 
but at home and quietly; (b) a proper mosque is a threat to public order, an attempt 
to proselytize, a symbol of fundamentalism, an opportunity for terrorism, an indul-
gence to Islamic invasion — in a word, an illegitimate trespass in the public sphere 
on the primary religious symbol of a dangerous religion and culture, and as such not 
to be tolerated; 
• the objectors’ arguments have been shown not to stand as sufficient reasons to limit 
the religious and liberty rights of the Muslim community, hence they are entirely  
intolerant and unjust, even though they are prompted by worries which are real and 
must be attended to politically. 
The question of the tolerance/intolerance of mosque building was originally raised by  
social sectors of the cultural majority objecting to proper mosques. Citizens in liberal  
democracy, however, have no power to hinder projects, such power belonging only to  
the state; hence they address their objections not horizontally to the minority or to other 
sectors of the majority, but vertically to political authorities, both national and local,  
and to administrators in order to have them stop the building project in question.  
Here is where a social attitude of intolerance, which cannot be acted upon legitimately,  
is transformed into a political issue, and in two senses. On the one hand, the objectors  
ask authorities to enforce the limits of toleration and to stick to the proper application  
of principles. On the other, political authorities are called into question because of the 
protest and vociferous discontent of a constituency demanding to be taken into account 
politically and to be represented by some party in democratic politics. As is apparent from 
all three cases, the two levels — the appeal to principles and the dynamic of protest —  
intertwine. Political authorities and administrators are thus driven by social protest, which 
usually manages to be represented by some political party, to take a stand, hence to make 
a decision either way that must be publicly justified. This is how political questions of  
toleration are produced in liberal democracies; more precisely, they are political not with 
reference to their content but with reference to the agency entitled to make the final  
decision. For in liberal democracy, no matter how socially powerful and vociferous, those 
opposing mosque building may protest and even behave offensively — spreading pig’s 
blood in the area where the mosque is supposed to be built (Allievi 2010), for example — 
and may invoke a referendum and so on, but, at the end of the day, the decision lies in the 
hands of the national and local authorities in charge of protecting and regulating religious 
freedom and of urban planning. Once the political decision is taken either way, those who 
see it as unjust can appeal to courts at various levels, right up to the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg. Both political and judicial decisions are vertical and top-
down, and the final outcome of this process of contestation will be the redrawing of  
toleration limits. 
 Whether the boundary includes proper mosques as tolerable in public or not, this  
decision will bear consequences on the standing of the Muslim minority in society. If  
public toleration of mosques is declared legitimate, then Muslims will be treated as equal 
members, on the same footing as other citizens of the polity, who are not compelled to 
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pray in the dark of basements and garages, better still if they are the outskirts of cities. 
The public tolerance of proper mosques will imply the recognition of Muslims as equals 
and will be based on equal respect (Galeotti 2002). The religious freedom of Muslims will 
be implicitly declared as equal to that of Christians or non-religious citizens. If, by  
contrast, toleration were limited to backyard mosques, then the freedom of Muslims 
would not be equal and their status as members of the polity would be that of second- 
class citizens, not recognized as fully autonomous persons but as members of a suspect 
group under probation. Given that, in liberal democracy, no one will accept being treated 
as an inferior or as a minor, Muslims will not be content with such a discriminatory deci-
sion and, sooner or later, will fight for equal rights. Thus an intolerant decision will not 
settle the issue, which will soon re-emerge, once the minority has become stronger and 
outspoken or the political orientation has changed. By contrast, even though it may  
encounter the protest of the objectors at first, the opposite decision will then come to be 
generally accepted, since toleration is also a function of time. If the cause of resentment is 
the upsetting of the identity of the public space, if the change is properly managed, people 
will eventually get used to the new landscape and to the new social standards, which will, 
also eventually, lose their unfamiliar appearance and be stabilized into another, more  
diverse, identity (Allievi 2010, 126). Looking at the mosque issue both from the point of 
view of justice and from that of long-term convenience, there is thus no doubt that  
the balance is all in favour of permitting proper mosques to be built in our cities. Never-
theless, there are short- and medium-term social and political problems linked to the  
identity of public space and to the control of societal standards that cannot be overlooked 
by wise democratic politics. Let us consider them briefly. 
 Looking at the cases under consideration and also at other research on the subject,  
discontent with plans for mosques is widespread, especially in neighbourhoods with a 
high density of immigrants, where problems of petty crime are experienced daily, urban 
dilapidation is evident and real-estate prices are sinking. In such neighbourhoods, local 
people are worried about their security and about the value of their homes, both serious 
causes for concern. I would like to stress here that the presence of a significant immigrant 
population does not necessarily correlate with intolerant feelings the negative correlation 
depending on time and the process of integration. The most tolerant districts are usually 
those where the immigrant population has been a visible presence for a while, and where 
people have learned to adjust and to become familiar with cultural differences. Discon-
tent, worries and insecurity characterize the impact of a sizable number of immigrants in a 
previously monocultural neighbourhood. Such feelings provide the grounds for populist 
right wing parties to campaign and gather support by exploiting the discontent and  
exaggerating the risk to security and public order. This has been the case in Denmark, 
Germany and Italy, and seems to be a trend in all European countries. The unsettlement 
produced by waves of immigration has found political agents, the so-called managers  
of fear, as its political representatives (Allievi 2010, 100 ff.). The problem is that, being 
non-citizens, Muslims from recent immigration have no opportunity for political repre-
sentation. Their situations change from country to country, because where they have been 
settled the longest — Germany, for example — they are usually citizens, and if they are 
not, as residents they have the vote in administrative and local elections. This is also the 
case in Denmark, whereas in Italy they are completely excluded from representation, at 
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both the national and local levels. To a deficit of political representation, Muslims add the 
lack of a proper congregation and a Church structure as a sole interlocutor with the state 
and administrators. Hence their claims are entrusted to their associations, which often 
have different views and disputes, to social agencies, such as NGOs and the like, and to 
the good will of political parties of the centre-left. In all three case studies, the claim for  
a proper mosque was originally advanced to local administrators by Muslim associations 
to obtain building permission. In both Germany and Denmark, local administrators  
approached the mosque case as a matter of urban planning; in this sense, they behaved 
neutrally with regard to the content of the request, caring only for procedural correctness 
and architectural fitness. Later, when the plan reached the point of implementation, the 
populist right-wing parties jumped in, raising a loud protest which became a subject of  
national debate and reached national government level. In Italy, by contrast, local admin-
istrators pulled out every possible device to obstruct and delay the plan, devices which 
made ad hoc and selective use of regulations with a clear discriminatory intent. Then the 
Lega Nord politicians jumped on the bandwagon and campaigned against the mosque 
plan at both local and government levels. The national government’s behaviour was  
cautious in all three cases. Governments did not want to take a clear stand on the issue:  
in Denmark, the Parliament voted for the district plan without providing a reason. In 
Germany, the Cologne discussion became national and the ruling party had to express  
itself at its national congress, where it came out in favour of a revision of the plan, though 
the final decision was left to the local government. After much controversy, in 2009 the 
foundations of the mosque (smaller and less visible than envisaged in the original plan) 
were laid. In Italy, decisions regarding places of worship are entrusted to regional law. 
Some such laws limiting the permission to build churches to recognized religions were 
appealed to the Supreme Court, which declared them unconstitutional (Sentence 
195/1995). However, the revision of the relevant law in Lombardy has simply entrusted 
the decision to local administrations on the basis of urban categories, hence leaving the 
way open to endless obstacles of a pragmatic nature, de facto obstructing a constitutional 
right. In general, we can see that national governments are reluctant to go against a con- 
stitutional right, but are sensitive to the protests of the populist right-wing parties for  
reasons of political calculus, which is why they tend to devolve the decision to local  
administrators. The latter may apply procedural rules impartially, hence favouring mosque 
projects, or selectively, hence blocking them. By contrast, courts are the place where the 
equal rights of Muslims are often reasserted, since they stick to principles, while political 
authorities are more sensitive to protest and electoral consent. 
 Where it has been taken, in this sketchy picture the tolerant decision looks more like a 
compromise and a modus vivendi than the recognition of Muslims’ religious rights. Could 
the issue have been handled in a different way so as to reconcile justice with the expecta-
tions of local residents about order and security? Justice clearly prescribes public tolera-
tion of proper mosques, which is a way of treating them with equal respect and promoting 
their full inclusion in democratic society, yet security worries and the uneasiness of the  
local population cannot be ignored by any reasonable politician. In order to solve this 
problem, I believe it is important to draw a distinction between the symbolic demand for 
recognition and the actual literal content of multicultural claims (Galeotti 2010). I state 
that all claims advanced by minorities contain an implicit demand for equal respect, that  
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is for minority members to be recognized as equal partners in the polity. Securing a right 
or a benefit is another small step towards being on an equal footing as members of the 
majority. This quest for recognition is the symbolic, non-negotiable part of the claim, 
while its actual content can be negotiated in relation to contextual variables. There is actu-
ally a scale of how much a claim is negotiable, depending on whether it concerns rights, 
benefits, or exemptions. If claims concern equal rights unduly denied to minorities, they 
represent what I call the level 0 of multicultural politics and should, in principle, be met 
without delay. If claims concern equivalent rights — that is the right to be treated differ-
ently in order to be equal (level 1), especially if it concerns special benefits or exemptions 
for minority groups (level 2) — the room for negotiation expands. Here we are faced with 
a level 0 case, that is the extension to Muslims of the same right granted to Christian and 
Jewish believers to have a dedicated and undisguised place of worship. From a normative 
viewpoint, there is no doubt that the claim ought to be satisfied. In a way, the cautious 
behaviour of public authorities shows that there are no margins for justified rejection: 
faced with internal discontent and a likely electoral price, had a justifiable argument 
against proper mosques been available, centre-right governments would probably have 
jumped at it. In other words, their timid position about mosques may be attributed to the 
lack of a publicly justifiable argument for their rejection. 
 Granted the level 0 of the mosque claim, I hold that in this case negotiations are in  
order to attend to local worries as well. Once ascertained that these worries are not just 
the product of prejudice and bias, they have to be taken seriously, even though they  
cannot take priority over equal rights. Here is where the distinction between the symbolic 
and the actual response comes in handy. First of all, Muslims must be listened to with 
consideration and respect by authorities and administrators; the lack of a unified voice of 
Muslims in European society may complicate the process, but it cannot be a reason for 
dismissing them or to coming to the unilateral decision that the most moderate associa-
tion is to be privileged, at least not from the outset. The associations of residents and their 
representatives must also be heard in order to separate reasonable claims from fears of 
novelty. With a clearer map of the problem, administrators should then seat all the actors 
at the same table, exercising a role as mediators and also promoting dialogue among  
associations, communities and people. This very procedure is, at the same time, meant to 
lead to a decision, hopefully shared by the parties, and also to be a means for attributing 
equal respect to the parties, thereby making the members of the minority feel on the same 
footing as citizens, and the latter not left behind and cut out of a decision concerning their 
neighbourhood and their city. This rosy picture is not simply a well-meaning story but 
corresponds basically the description of what has happened in Turin, my city, over the 
building of a proper mosque. Turin is not a case that is part of my research yet, but I have 
heard this story from the mayor’s own mouth in the course of a public debate. He said 
that the recipe for a successful solution to the mosque issue (and probably to similar  
multicultural issues) has been: (a) sticking to principles in perspective; (b) talking to all  
actors round a table, at first separately, then together; (c) deflating attitudes toward obsta-
cles, keeping parking issue separate from the fear of terrorism, for instance; (d) promoting 
a process of reciprocal knowledge and developing trust; (e) good mastering of and atten-
tion to the bureaucratic procedures to avoid administrative obstacles. This process does 
not allow for a ready solution: the discussion has been going on for a few years now and 
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the decision to build the mosque has been taken, but building has not yet begun and the 
Lega Nord is promising a fight and demanding a referendum. To the referendum chal-
lenge, the mayor responded that constitutional rights are not a matter for a referendum. 
This represented quite a strong stand in favour of the mosque, seen as the implementation 
of constitutional rights. The mosque, however, has not yet been built and the issue may 
break out again. Still — and here I speak with the greatest caution — the mayor’s seems 
to me an exemplary way of dealing with the problem, a way of turning the fight against 
Islamic symbols, which condemns Muslims to the margins of public space, into an oppor-
tunity for their integration in the visible space of the city. 
 A final comment on the dual strategy of symbolic recognition and negotiation. The 
analysis of all three cases shows that Muslim representatives in the debate have been  
willing to revise their original plan, to reduce the size of the mosque, and to give up the 
minaret. In a word, in the controversy Muslims have appeared to act as the reasonable 
party, in the sense of Rawls’s reasonableness (Rawls 1993). This is an important point  
insofar as it belies the alleged intrinsic dogmatism and fundamentalism of Islam, revealing 
the chances of success of the strategy of recognition and negotiation outlined above. 
 
 
 
5. IS THE MOSQUE A CASE OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION? 
I started my argument by showing that the mosque conflict is a typical case of contempo-
rary toleration, and, more precisely, of the public toleration of a building which is the 
symbol of the difference of Muslims. I have argued that the public toleration of mosques 
is required by equal respect for Muslims, who have the right to enjoy the same liberties as 
other citizens. Now I intend to draw some conclusions from the argument on the control 
of societal standards and to show that the mosque conflict is not a case of religious tolera-
tion, neither exclusively nor primarily. Mosques are without doubt places of worship and 
of meeting for Muslim believers, hence they are definitely symbols of faith. Yet resistance 
to the building of proper mosques is not based on specifically religious reasons: the  
worries are not that a heresy may take hold among Christians, nor that miscreants may be 
encouraged to proliferate, and there is no desire to eradicate the wrong religion in order to 
save the souls of erring people. These were the reasons that motivated the religious wars 
in 16th- and 17th-century Europe, when conflict was focused on theological divergences 
and disagreement over church organization. Power and politics were present too, provid-
ing the military might for waging war, but were not the crucial reason for starting it. The 
freedom claimed by Luther and Protestants was primarily religious freedom: to pursue 
one’s creed and be freed from the Church of Rome’s monopoly, which was precisely what 
the Catholic Church and its political allies denied. 
 In the mosque contest, this is clearly not what is at stake. No theological dispute lies at 
the origin of the objections to mosques and no criticism of the religious organization of 
Muslims is present in the debate, except for the accusation of fundamentalism, which is 
however superficial and not based on solid knowledge of Islam in its many articulations. 
Thus religious disagreement is not the real point, which also explains why many commen-
tators maintain that religious freedom is protected in any case, as mentioned above. The 
real point, as I have tried to show, is the contest over the control on societal standards 
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and on the identity of public space, which the majority feels is being threatened by the  
visible presence of unfamiliar symbols, practices, customs and modes of appearance that 
upset the orderly stability of social life in public. Muslim religion is providing a ready- 
to-use label unifying immigrants from many and different cultures, more different than 
those from Eastern Europe, hence more threatening to societal standards and allegedly 
more dangerous. Here is where Islam comes in handy, for it provides the grounds for  
articulating the diffidence and hostility towards alien customs and darker, usually poor, 
people in reasons spendable in public discourse and based on two considerations: (a)  
Islam is dangerous because of fundamentalism and terrorism; (b) Islam is unacceptable 
because of its oppression of women. Terrorism is universally condemned, hence definitely 
beyond the boundary of the tolerable; likewise, violence and oppression of women clearly 
trespass against the harm principle and cannot be accepted in the name of tolerance. 
Once these two features are taken as the core of Islam, then opposition to the public  
toleration of any symbol of Muslim religion, from hijab to halal prescriptions to mosques, 
has found an apparently legitimate general justification which helps to keep the presence 
of Muslims at the margins of public life, quietly active at their workplaces and disappear-
ing back to their ghettos at night. 
 This is usually the stuff of the widespread Islamophobia of Europeans (Massari 2006; 
EUMC 2006), which is not the product of religious disagreement. On the contrary, I hold 
that Islam is nothing but a cover for cultural distaste for the newcomers with darker skin 
and unfamiliar customs and rituals who are “invading” our cities and countries, since such 
distaste and xenophobia cannot be spelled out in public reason. That the contest over 
mosques is not primarily religious is corroborated by the following considerations. 
 (a) Where Muslims are an established presence, such as in Cyprus and Israel, there 
seems to be no religious tensions and mosques appear to be accepted as a matter of fact. 
That is the case even if both Cyprus and Israel experience open conflict over territorial 
distribution with the populations of Muslim persuasion. Yet such conflict has not led  
anyone to contest mosques and regular mosque attendance by the Muslim minority.  
The case studies on Israel and Cyprus show that conflict may arise with reference to the 
construction of new mosques in non-Muslim neighbourhoods (Israel) or to the use of old 
mosques by Muslim immigrants of the Shia persuasion (Cyprus). Thus it is not mosques 
per se, but the upsetting novelty of a strange and alien building that creates uneasiness and 
worry (Skoulakiri 2010). Similarly, in Austria, where a populist right-wing party is present 
and has expressed strong anti-mosque feelings, the oldest European mosque, in Vienna, 
has never been contested by residents. Likewise, in Rome the biggest European mosque is 
accepted and has become part of the urban landscape. This would appear to confirm that 
the conflict is not about religion, but about the identity of public space. If mosques have 
long been part of this space, they cease to be perceived as a dissonant element and no one 
takes issue with their presence. 
 (b) Most of the time Christian congregations have acted in favour of mosque building, 
defending and promoting the right to religious liberty across different creeds (de Galem-
bert 1998). Had the conflict been religious in nature, I expect that they would have taken  
a different stand. 
 (c) Political institutions, as we have seen, have been timid as a rule, but they have not 
taken an active role in objecting to mosques. In other words, the standoff is not and could 
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not be represented as one of the familiar kind between the state and the dominant and 
powerful church over secularization. In Europe Muslims definitely do not represent  
the dominant church, which has provoked the state to reaffirm its prerogatives and its 
neutrality against religion’s invasion of the political sphere. We have seen that something 
of this kind has happened in Cyprus, where the state has been active in reducing the privi-
leges of the dominant Orthodox Church. So the mosque issue cannot be defined as a 
chapter in the fight between church and state that characterizes the formation of liberal 
institutions.  
 (d) Among the various Muslims associations active in a social context, political authori-
ties have privileged those grouping citizens who have converted to the Muslim religion. 
This preference is not explained by religious reasons, but rather by the idea that citizens 
who have grown up in our culture are more trustworthy and more easy to deal with. 
Again, the significant variable seems to be culture and familiarity. 
 (e) The controversial family customs of Muslim immigrants, especially with reference 
to women and girls, are cultural traits widespread in Asian and African traditional and 
tribal habits and lifestyles, in many respect similar to those of Mediterranean areas until 
few decades ago. Their connection with religion is, if at all, tenuous. Moreover, they have 
no logical connection with the denial of place of worship to Muslims. In a way, it is just 
the opposite. We can imagine that, if Muslims were accepted as equals in our cities, with 
their own places of worship and gathering like everyone else, this fact would enhance a 
process of integration that would slowly affect the whole community and the individual 
rights within it. 
 (f) The suspicion of a link between European Muslims and Islamic states, such as Iran 
or Saudi Arabia, which underlies the funding problem, expresses a political worry, not a 
religious one. It is the suspicion that the loyalty of European Muslims is primarily with 
those non-democratic authorities. Such states would then have internal allies to promote 
the diffusion of fundamentalism and of Islam over European contexts. It is the same  
suspicion that Western democracies had for Communists during the Cold War, namely 
that an internal sector of democratic society could act as the agent of a foreign and hostile 
power from within democratic institutions. It is a case of political mistrust and of fear of 
fanaticism, not of religious disagreement. 
 If the mosque issue is acknowledged to be a question of toleration over societal stand-
ards as opposed to a question of religious toleration, some relevant implications can be 
drawn. First of all, the problem is not about incompatibility of principles, beliefs and  
values, nor about the irreducible clash of civilizations leading to the suppression of one 
over the other. This dramatic representation, which has enjoyed a certain success and 
echo through the Western media, is the worst premise for working out a viable and just 
solution, fuelling hostility and fear on both sides. Secondly, since it is not focused on 
theological truths, the conflict is not about ultimate and absolute views, which thus  
cannot be traded off for a peaceful settlement. This common understanding of religious 
conflict evokes risks of Balkanization and suggests the need for a preventive stoppage  
to easy tolerance. If, by contrast, the issue is shown to be about societal standards and  
toleration — i.e. peaceful coexistence with customs, practices, habits different from our 
own, which would re-draw the public landscape of our society, both symbolically and  
literally — then we gain a more accurate and less dramatic description of what is at stake. 
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Such a description, moreover, will allow us to settle the issue, reconciling justice for  
Muslims and stability by attending to the real worries of local residents. Democratic prin-
ciples — i.e. equal respect and equal rights — and democratic procedures — i.e. repre-
sentation, public discussion and negotiation — seem to be the tools for working out the 
recognition of the legitimate presence of different identities and of wider and more  
diverse social standards. 
 
 
 
6. THE INVISIBLE MUSLIMS OF SLOVENIA 
I set apart the case of Slovenia because there Muslims are not a group of more or less  
recent immigration, but citizens of the former Yugoslav Federation (Pribac 2011). They 
are a national minority in Kymlicka’s sense (Kymlicka 1995, 2001), given that they origi-
nally came from other Balkan nations, mainly Bosnia or Kosovo. Though Muslims arrived  
in Slovenia at different times — from the 15th century to the Hapsburg period, or when 
Yugoslavia was a state, before and after World War Two — they have long been residents 
and citizens. In the former Yugoslavia, they did not need passports or visas to move 
around and change their residence from Bosnia or Kosovo to Slovenia. 
 The mosque problem was first raised back in the 1960s, when Slovenia was still part of 
the Yugoslav Federation, under a socialist regime. The solution was then obstructed by 
the socialist stand against religion. The ideological obstacle fell when Slovenia seceded 
from Yugoslavia and became an independent state, a liberal democracy, which grants 
freedom of religion and equal rights to all. Yet Muslims have not benefited from this new 
situation, in principle favourable to granting any congregation its proper place of worship. 
The new state projected a national identity that comprised Catholic religion as one of its 
components. Moreover, interethnic conflict broke out in the region and became more  
and more devastating, so that ethnic conflicts overlapped with religious identities — not 
an ideal situation for recognizing a national minority with a different creed. The self-
presentation of Slovenia was as the state for Slovenian people with a strong emphasis on a 
compact national identity that left little room for concern with minorities. In this context, 
equal rights and equal respect for the Muslim community were definitely not a priority 
and were never put on the political agenda. When the mosque problem resurfaced at  
the end of the 1990s, loud objections were immediately raised. Among the objectors, the 
popular Archbishop Roda also took issue with the mosque, thus distancing himself from 
the position generally taken by religious authorities in other European countries, for  
example in neighbouring Italy. To such objections, similar in their content to the ones we 
have seen above, political authorities took a cautious stand, neither definitely negative to 
mosque building, nor affirming the right of Muslim communities to be treated equally and 
respectfully. Though public discussion has been somewhat similar to that in other Euro-
pean countries, significant differences must be underlined in the Slovenian case. The issue 
has not been about the defence of traditional societal standards and public space from 
newcomers strange habits and customs (indeed Muslims are not newcomers in Slovenia, 
though some immigration from Bosnia did take place during the Balkan wars). The issue 
has rather been about the defence of the monocultural national identity, that underlies  
the very project of creating a Slovenian state out of a multinational federation. 
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A significant fact gives weight to this thesis, one which commentators would appear to 
have failed to link with the mosque issue (Pribac 2011). At the time of the secession, more 
than 27,000 people were erased from the register of citizens and enlisted as foreigners  
because they had omitted to apply for citizenship in due time. Most of those people were 
Muslims of Bosnian origin, who consequently lost their documents, identity and residen-
cy, thus becoming non-persons. The scandal over the “erased” people erupted in 2002, 
and has not been solved to date. Putting together the controversy over the mosque and 
the official disappearance of this large number of Muslim ex-citizens, I would infer with 
some confidence that the issue here has not concerned the control of societal standards, 
but rather the self-representation of Slovenians as a unified people where Roma and  
Bosnians do not belong. Toleration here regards the diversity of citizenry, not the diversi-
ty of cultures, at least not in the first place in any case. Moreover, the position of the state 
has clearly been much more defensive of its unified identity than protective of the newly 
conquered constitutional principles. Elsewhere, states have been timid, but have not stood 
with the objectors; here the Slovenian state has been the main agent of the misrecognition 
of Muslim minority as a component of Slovenian nation, as if the new democracy were 
too fragile to open up to pluralism. Yet it is precisely openness and inclusiveness that are 
the test for a democratic state. 
 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
I have argued that the mosque conflict, so widespread throughout Europe, is indeed  
an issue of toleration, de facto representing a typical example of the controversies over  
toleration erupting in contemporary democracy. In order to argue this point, I have had to 
reframe the conditions and circumstances posited by the traditional theory of toleration 
patterned after pre-liberal states. When toleration becomes constitutionally inbuilt and 
equal rights are implemented, toleration questions of some political relevance do not  
disappear, but still arise with reference to the proper and justified limits to tolerance. The 
public controversy is thus about whether a certain feature of a different culture, such as a 
proper mosque, infringes on the limits of toleration, hence justifies political interference. 
 The interpretation of the limits of toleration is traditionally fixed in two principles, self-
defence and harm to others, and traced between private and public space. I have shown 
the ambiguity of the spatial delimitation of toleration which intertwines with these two 
principles and I have also shown that the demarcation of toleration in the private sphere 
and regulations in the public area is intrinsically ambiguous since “private” does not imply 
“out of public sight” and “public” does not necessarily overlap with “political”. This am-
biguity has made possible a double standard in the understanding of toleration, according 
to which the majority’s eccentricities are tolerated everywhere as matters of personal  
liberty, while the minority’s differences tend to be restricted not only in the political 
sphere but in public space as well, as forms of invasion and trespass on the legitimate 
boundary of toleration. Hence contemporary issues have to do with this contention that 
the toleration of minority differences be confined to private areas — that is out of public 
sight — and with the minority’s attempts to make them legitimately visible in the  
public space. Toleration today has clearly to do with public space. Purpose-built mosques, 
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clearly in public sight, represent a paradigmatic case of contemporary toleration. The  
public controversy over proper mosques, originated by objectors, revolves around the fact 
that the very visibility of a proper mosque constitutes a trespass on the limits of tolera-
tion, bringing about issues of public order that supposedly imply an infringement of self-
defence. Thus, in the objectors’ argument, the principled limit of toleration (self-defence) 
is conflated with the spatial limit, which, however, applies only to minority differences  
in a blunt double standard. Among the reasons according to which a proper mosque 
would jeopardize public order, some are the result of prejudice and bias and some are not 
specific to mosques, but others point to a real problem: the upsetting of societal standards 
by alien customs and practices. This problem, which is what is really at stake, is not a  
sufficient justification for stopping public toleration of a proper mosque, but it needs to 
be addressed politically if a just and stable settlement of the mosque issue is to be found. 
 Among multicultural issues, the mosque case belongs to the level 0 type — i.e. those 
concerning the extension of equal rights to groups who have been unjustly excluded from 
full-right enjoyment — hence one which justice is required to solve without much ado. 
Nevertheless, the upsetting of societal standards by a change in the identity of public 
space is a real problem for local expectations, one to be addressed politically. I have thus 
suggested a procedure to address the mosque case whereby equal respect is paid to all  
the parties involved is showed by setting up a table round which claims and problems can 
be raised, considered and addressed through negotiation. There can be no question that 
Muslims have the right to places of worship in Western cities; where and how mosques 
are to be built can be negotiated in a process involving all the interested parties so as to 
promote reciprocal knowledge and trust. 
 Once ascertained that the mosque issue is a veritable case of toleration, I have asked  
of which kind of toleration the building of a mosque is a symbol. Since mosques are  
the places of worship of the Muslim religion, it would seem obvious here that we are deal-
ing with a case of religious toleration. I have argued, though, that religion is really epi-
phenomenal compared to cultural differences upsetting societal standards. Besides adding 
conceptual precision, such definitional arguments — first the one about toleration, now 
this one about different kinds of toleration — have relevant political implications. If the 
mosque dispute is acknowledged as an issue of toleration, the opposition to mosques is 
defined as “intolerant”, which is precisely what the objectors want to avoid, given that 
toleration represents the status quo in liberal democracy. Similarly, if the mosque case is 
defined as an example of religious toleration, then the controversy is represented, on the 
one hand, as nobler, and on the other, as a matter of the irreducible clash between an  
intolerant and dogmatic religion, implying fundamentalism, and the Christian and secular 
values of Western civilization. So the objection to plans for mosques are, at the same 
time, made acceptable and irreducible because what is at stake is the incompatibility of  
Islam with our liberal and democratic values. By contrast, if the contest is understood  
for what it is, a fight for the control of societal standards, the conflict loses its dramatic 
features, and the question of justice, insofar as it concerns the equal rights of Muslims, 
appears in the forefront and the possibility of accommodations with residents can be  
outlined. 
 Finally, I have devoted attention to the case of the forgotten mosques of the Slovenian 
Muslims, arguing that here we are faced with a different case of toleration. At stake is not 
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the contest over societal standards and the goal is not the inclusion of newcomers, with 
their different identity and customs, into the public space of our democracy. What we 
have here is rather a conflict over national identity in which national minorities are wilfully 
ignored. It is possible that, with the stabilization of Slovenia as a democracy within the 
EU, the terms of the conflict may change, and the national minority issue may be treated 
according to the principles of democracy. But, in any case, in order to have a clear target 
in mind, it is important to stress that the nature of toleration is strictly connected with 
what is at stake. 
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